


















In 2005, China abated its fixed exchange rate against the U.S. dollar and began to 
appreciate the Renminbi (RMB). In this paper, I explore the effect of the appreciation of 
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In 2005, China abated its ￿xed exchange rate against the U.S. dollar and began to
appreciate the Renminbi (RMB). In this paper, I explore the e⁄ect of the appreciation
of the RMB on imports to the U.S. from China by augmenting the gravity model with
the exchange rate. Using an industrial panel data set during the period 2002 to
2008 and controlling for the endogeneity of the bilateral exchange rate, this extensive
empirical analysis suggests that the appreciation of the RMB against the U.S. dollar
signi￿cantly reduced imports to the U.S. from China. This ￿nding is robust to a
variety of econometric methods and to coverage in di⁄erent periods.
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Exchange rate movement and its pass-through to changes in domestic prices have been
topics of wide concern among economists. However, relatively few studies have empirically
investigated the relationship between exchange rate movements and trade ￿ ow. This paper
￿lls this gap by investigating the e⁄ect of the appreciation of the Chinese Renminbi (RMB)
on imports to the U.S. from China.
Today, China has replaced Mexico as the second-largest trading partner with the U.S.
In July 2005, China abated its ￿xed exchange rate to the U.S. dollar but pegged its
currency to a basket of currencies. Since then, the RMB has appreciated by about 20%
against the U.S. dollar, from 8.3 to 6.8 RMB per dollar. Simultaneously, China￿ s bilateral
trade surplus from the U.S. decreased from US$232 billion in 2006 to US$114 billion in
2008. This raises the question: has the RMB appreciation decreased the imports to the
U.S. from China?
The economic intuition behind this question seems straightforward: the appreciation
of the RMB resulted in more expensive Chinese exports; consequently, exports diminished
while imports increased. However, answering the question is not, by any means, trivial.
It is widely recognized that bilateral trade volumes are a⁄ected by the trading countries￿
GDP, declining trade costs, and trade liberalization (Feenstra, 1998). The appreciation
of the RMB would have a pass-through e⁄ect on American import prices, which in turn
would a⁄ect the amount of imports to the U.S. from China. By this means, the exchange
rate has an e⁄ect on the domestic import price similar to that of tari⁄s, which has been
1recognized as the symmetry hypothesis between tari⁄s and the exchange rate (e.g., see
Feenstra, 1989). Therefore, the e⁄ect of exchange rate movements on bilateral trade
remains an empirical issue.
The gravity model is perhaps the only one model that can successfully explain the
growing trade volumes. In its simplest version, the gravity model suggests that the bilateral
trade volume is directly proportional to the trading countries￿GDP (Tinbergen, 1962). I
therefore adopt a theoretical gravity model with general equilibrium to access the e⁄ect of
appreciation of the RMB on Sino-U.S. bilateral trade. The innovation of this paper is that
I explicitly introduce the exchange rate into the theoretical gravity framework, hence am
able to estimate the e⁄ect of the yuan￿ s revaluation on imports to the U.S. from China.1
Extensive analysis suggests that the revaluation of the Chinese yuan signi￿cantly reduced
imports to the U.S. from China. Chinese exchange rate movements are helpful in reducing
the bilateral Sino-U.S. trade imbalance and accordingly in avoiding a possible trade war
between the two countries.
This paper joins a growing literature on exchange rates and trade. As introduced by
Goldberg and Knetter (1997), there are three related strands in the mainstream literature
about exchange rates and goods prices. They cover the pass-through of exchange rates,
the law of one price, and pricing-to-market. Feenstra (1989) found that the symmetry
hypothesis between tari⁄s and exchange rates is easily supported using Japanese and U.S.
data. This seminal work also suggests that there is a symmetric response of import prices
1In this paper I do not consider strategic trade policies used by either the home or foreign country to
introduce the "terms of trade" changes. The only reason for terms of trade changes is the stylized fact
that the U.S. is the largest economy in the world today.
2to changes in import tari⁄s and bilateral exchange rates.
Regarding the previous research on the Sino-U.S. trade and exchange rate, Thorbecke
and Zhang (2006) estimated that the Sino-U.S. real exchange rate in the long run is
around a unit. By including China￿ s other main trading partners except the United States,
Thorbecke and Smith (2010) rationalized that the appreciation of the RMB helps to reduce
the bilateral Sino-U.S. trade imbalance. In particular, a 10% RMB appreciation leads to
a decrease of 12% in ordinary exports and 4% in processing exports. The asymmetric
e⁄ects of RMB appreciation on processing trade and ordinary trade are also explored by
Mann and Plueck (2007). Bergin and Feenstra (2008) explored how a change in the share
of U.S. imports from a country like China with a ￿xed exchange rate could a⁄ect the
pass-through of the exchange rate to import prices in the U.S. By way of comparison,
the main aim of the present paper is to determine how movements of the exchange rate
a⁄ect imports to the U.S. from China when the terms of trade improvement for importers
and the incomplete pass-through of the exchange rate are allowed. Last but not least,
Yu (2009) suggested that the RMB appreciation against the dollar signi￿cantly reduced
China￿ s exports to the United States but had no signi￿cant e⁄ects on China￿ s exports to
Japan by using three-stage least-square (3SLS) estimations.
To explore fully the e⁄ect of the RMB exchange rate on imports to the U.S. from China,
my estimations are based on a theoretical gravity framework; however, I do not attempt
to predict the exchange rate￿ s in￿ uence theoretically, but rather to use a tightly speci￿ed
theory to inform the empirical analysis. It turns out that the structural parameters based
on the theoretical framework help us to understand the impact of the exchange rate on
3trade.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie￿ y introduces China￿ s
exchange rate reform in the past decade. Section 3 presents a theoretical gravity equation
that includes the exchange rate. Section 4 introduces the estimation methodology. Section
5 discusses the estimation results and presents robustness checks. Section 6 concludes the
paper.
2 China￿ s Exchange Rate Reform
China claimed to move toward a market economy in 1992. Shortly afterwards, the ex-
change rate in China was ￿xed at the level of 8.3 RMB per dollar from 1994. During
the East Asian Financial Crisis (1997￿ 1998), many countries depreciated their own cur-
rencies to mitigate the negative shocks caused by the crisis. For example, the Thai baht
was depreciated by around 40%. In contrast, China insisted on maintaining the value of
the RMB at the pre-crisis level. However, in July 2005 the RMB against the dollar was
revaluated at 2%. In addition, the RMB was no longer solely pegged to the U.S. dollar.
The peg was changed to a basket of currencies, including the U.S. dollar and the Japanese
yen, among others. Since then, the Chinese currency has been appreciated to 6.83 RMB
per dollar in December 2008, a 20% revaluation.
Why did the Chinese government revalue the RMB in 2005? One important reason
was the surging bilateral trade imbalance with the U.S. From 2002 to 2006, the bilateral
Sino-U.S. annual trade growth rate was more than 20%. In 2007, China had already
replaced Mexico as America￿ s second-largest trading partner when the bilateral trade
4total (including Hong Kong￿ s re-exports) reached US$318 billion. Simultaneously, China
also maintained a huge trade surplus with the U.S. In 2004, the bilateral trade surplus
was US$161 billion.
Equally importantly, the Multi-Fiber Agreements, which set an upper bound for textile
exports from China to the U.S., were automatically terminated in January 2005 according
to the requirements set by the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) in the Uruguay
Round of the GATT. As a result, China￿ s textile exports to the U.S. increased dramatically.
In response to demands by special interest groups, such as labor unions, the U.S. Congress
threatened to impose trade sanctions on China if it did not "voluntarily" restrain its
exports to the U.S. In order to avoid a further bilateral trade war, the Chinese government
agreed to revaluate its RMB against the dollar by 2% on July 21, 2005. In addition, the
exchange rate was allowed to ￿ uctuate within a restricted band.
In this paper I focus on how the recent structural change in 2005 has a⁄ected the
Sino-U.S. bilateral trade. At ￿rst glance, as shown in Figure 1, the imports to the U.S.
from China kept an increasing trend over the years 2002￿ 2008. Simultaneously, the Sino-
U.S. exchange rate, measured as RMB per dollar, has kept declining since July 2005.
Motivated by these observations, in the next section, I develop a theoretical framework
aimed at exploring the relationship between exchange rate movements and bilateral trade.
[Insert Figure 1 Here]
53 Theoretical Gravity Framework
Following Yu (2010), suppose that each country produces unique product varieties; the
export of good h in industry k from country i to the importer (i.e., the U.S.) is identical
to the consumption of good h in industry k in the U.S. Exporter i = 1;:::;I has K










i;us;k)￿dhdkdi;(￿ > 0) (1)
where Ch
i;us;k is American consumption of good h in industry k produced by country i.
The elasticity of substitution ￿ is denoted as ￿ = 1=(1 ￿ ￿). Following Anderson and van
Wincoop (2003), I assume that, given each exporter i, ph
i;us;k = ph0
i;us;k for all h and h
0
in
f1;:::;Nikg, i.e., all the goods in industry k imported by the U.S. from country i have
the same price pi;us;k.2 In addition, American consumption is identical over the entire
line of products within industry k sold by country i, i.e., Ch
i;us;k = Ch0
i;usk = Ci;us;k;8h 2















2Note that prices of varieties are allowed to di⁄er across industries. This assumption is roughly con-
sistent with the reality: the price of a Chrysler-type automobile is close to that of a Ford, but it is very
di⁄erent from the price of a pencil.
6where Y us is the U.S. GDP. By solving this maximization problem, I obtain the demand

























where the ￿rst equality follows the de￿nition of export value, and the second one is due to
the equal price assumption across varieties of goods. Combining (4), (5), and (6), I obtain







However, bilateral trade is also a⁄ected by the number of varieties in the exporting
country, Nch
k , which is unfortunately unobservable. For estimation, I consider the mo-
nopolistic competition model presented originally by Krugman (1979), which helps us to
eliminate the number of exporting varieties in my gravity equation (7).
As in Krugman (1979), Baier and Bergstrand (2001), and Feenstra (2002), the repre-
sentative ￿rm in a country maximizes pro￿ts. Speci￿cally, the production of goods (ych
k )
incurs a ￿xed cost (￿ch
k ) and a constant marginal cost (￿ch
k ) given that labor (lch
k ) is the






7The monopolistically competitive equilibrium implies two conditions for the represen-
tative ￿rm. First, the marginal revenue should equal marginal cost for the representative
￿rm. Since the elasticity of demand equals the elasticity of substitution, ￿, when China￿ s
number of goods Nch




where the wage in China is denoted as wch.
Second, the representative ￿rm obtains zero pro￿ts due to free entry. Given that the






k ), I obtain the equilibrium
production level, ￿ ych









k is a constant number given that ￿;￿ch
k and ￿ch
k are all constant parameters. By
denoting the bilateral exchange rate ($=RMB) as e, the GDP in China measured in dollars







k is the output share of industry k in China. Substituting












Therefore, bilateral trade depends on the bilateral exchange rate as well as the trading
countries￿GDP, China￿ s industrial output share, the ￿xed production of China￿ s repre-
sentative ￿rm, and various price indices. Note that in (10), I use disaggregated industrial
output to measure American income but GDP to measure Chinese income. The reason
is that I do not have data on disaggregated Chinese industrial data. For convenience, I
include the main notation of the model in Appendix Table 1.
84 Empirical Methodology
To estimate the gravity equation (10), I specify the estimating equation by taking logs on
both sides:
lnXch
us;k = ln(Y chY us
k )￿lne￿lnpch
k +lnsch
k +(1￿￿)lnpch;us;k￿(1￿￿)lnPk￿ln ￿ ych
k : (11)
Like tari⁄s, the bilateral exchange rate serves as a kind of "iceberg" trade cost across
borders (Samuelson, 1952). The RMB appreciation would have a partial pass-through
e⁄ect on the domestic import prices in the U.S. Put another way, like imposing a tari⁄ on
the imports of a large country, the movement of the exchange rate lowers the exporter￿ s
(China) prices. We shall consider pch;us;k = e(pch
k )￿ where ￿ < 1 to capture this idea.3
Note that pch;us;k is the industrial price on a c.i.f.(cost, insurance, freight) basis whereas
pch
k is the industrial price on a f.o.b.(free on board) basis. By taking the log, we have:
lnpch;us;k = ￿k + lne + ￿ lnpch
k + ￿k: (12)
Finally, the constant term, ￿k ; captures any other bilateral "border" e⁄ects that are not
speci￿ed in (12).
Now I obtain the estimating equation for each period by substituting (12) into (11):
lnXch
us;kt = ln(Y ch
t Y us
kt ) ￿ ￿ lnet + (￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 1)lnpch
kt
+[(1 ￿ ￿)￿k ￿ ln ￿ ych
k + lnsch
kt + (￿ ￿ 1)lnPkt + (1 ￿ ￿)￿kt]: (13)
In this speci￿cation, the log directional imports to the U.S. from China, an indicator
3Di⁄erent speci￿cations would not change the estimation results in the following section.
9of trade openness, mainly depends on the trading countries￿GDP, the bilateral exchange
rate, and China￿ s f.o.b. price index (lnpch
k ).
However, in (13), in addition to the unspeci￿ed border e⁄ects (￿kt), and the representa-
tive ￿rm￿ s production in China (￿ ych
kt), China￿ s industrial output share (sch
kt) is unobservable.
In addition, although the American aggregate price index, Pkt; in the speci￿cation (13) is
also unobservable since it depends on the unobservable exporter￿ s number of goods, Nch
k ;
according to (5), it is still worthwhile to use American producer price index (PPI) to serve
as a proxy of American aggregate price index. Instead, all the other terms mentioned
above are abstracted from the theoretical sense and may not have good empirical counter-
parts in the reality.4 As a result, such terms are absorbed into the error term, ￿kt, which
is as follows:
￿kt = (1 ￿ ￿)￿k ￿ ln ￿ ych
k + lnsch
kt + (1 ￿ ￿)￿kt:
Following Feenstra (1989), the expected exchange rate in each quarter is a log-linear
function of the current and past three quarters￿average spot rates.5 Accordingly, I have
the following speci￿cation for the estimations:
lnXch
us;kt = ￿0 + ￿1 lnY ch




￿3l lnet￿l + ￿4 lnpch
kt + ￿5 lnPkt + ￿kt: (14)
Note that in this bilateral trade equation (14) I do not restrict the coe¢ cient of trading
countries￿GDP as a unit. Instead, the coe¢ cients ￿1and ￿2 are allowed to absorb the
e⁄ects of the trading partners￿sizes on bilateral trade in a ￿ exible manner, though the two
4I thank a referee for suggesting this point.
5Choosing di⁄erent numbers of past quarterly average spot rates does not substantially change the
estimation results.
10variables are also moved to the LHS as the denominator of the regressand as a robustness
check later.
5 Data, Econometrics, and Results
In this section, I ￿rst describe the data sets used in the paper, followed by a discussion of
the econometric methods. I then address the possible endogeneity problem. Finally, the
section concludes with various robustness checks.
5.1 Data
The sample covers seven years (from the ￿rst quarter of 2002 to the last quarter of 2008).
The reason for choosing this period is that the imports of the U.S. from China and ac-
cordingly the Sino-U.S. bilateral trade increased dramatically after China acceded to the
WTO in 2001. The regressand of the estimate is the log of industrial imports from China
to the U.S. at the SITC two-digit level. These directional imports are consistent with the
prediction of the gravity model, which only considers one-way trade ￿ ow (Baldwin and
Taglioni, 2006). I also use import data to the U.S. rather than Chinese export data to
avoid the imprecise measures due to China￿ s re-export (from Hong Kong) situation (Feen-
stra and Hanson, 2004). Among the independent variables, the spot exchange rate of the
RMB against the dollar is measured by using quarterly average rates. The reason for not
adopting the spot rate is to avoid its daily random error (Feenstra, 1989).6
Turning to the price data, it is most appropriate to use China wholesale unit-values
6As pointed out by Meese and Rogo⁄ (1983) and con￿rmed by Feenstra (1989), using the quarterly
forward exchange rate does not change the results.
11f.o.b. prices to determine industrial prices in China. Unfortunately, such data are currently
inaccessible. Following Baier and Bergstrand (2001), I therefore use China￿ s industrial
price index (PPI) to measure the f.o.b. price.7 All data used in the present paper are
publicly available from the CEIC database.8 Trading partners￿GDP and GDP per capita
are measured in constant U.S. dollars. Module A of Table 1 o⁄ers a concordance between
the SITC two-digit categories and the PPI categories in China. Similarly, Module B of
Table 1 provides a concordance between the U.S. output data and trade data at each
industrial level.
[Insert Table 1 Here]
Panel A of Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for each variable. There are 1,736
quarterly observations in the Sino-U.S. estimations because 62 industries over 2002￿ 2008
are covered.9
[Insert Table 2 Here]
5.2 Main Estimates
Table 3 presents the estimated e⁄ects of the value of the RMB in terms of the U.S.
dollar on trade. Note that the exchange rate is measured in dollars per RMB in all the
7Note that data on PPI should be less volatile and have a lower mean than data on the wholesale
unit-values f.o.b. price. As a result, using the PPI data may underestimate the economic magnitude of
the price variable. However, one does not need to worry much about that since such a variable serves only
as a control variable and is not the main particular interest in the paper. I thank a diligent referee for
pointing this out.
8CEIC Data Company Ltd. ("CEIC") specializes in providing high quality, comprehensive
databases, focusing on Asian economic, industrial and ￿nancial time series data. Data source:
http://www.ceicdata.com.
9Note that there are six missing observations of log US imports from China.
12estimations. Therefore, an increase in the exchange rate indicates an appreciation of the
RMB. The ￿rst column reports the benchmark pooled OLS results. The coe¢ cients of the
log GDP for both U.S. and China are positive and signi￿cant, which is consistent with
the theoretical prediction that larger countries trade more. Trade is directly proportional
to trading countries￿GDP. The coe¢ cient of China￿ s prices is negative and signi￿cant
at the conventional level, which implies that increased export prices are associated with
decreased exports from China.
More importantly, the negative sign of the bilateral exchange rate clearly suggests
that a larger appreciation of RMB (i.e., a higher bilateral exchange rate) leads to lower
imports to the U.S. from China. In Column (2), following Feenstra (1989), I include the
quarterly lags of exchange rates in the regressions because the previous exchange rates
might a⁄ect their current bilateral directional trade. It turns out that the coe¢ cient of
the log exchange rate in the current period remains stable and is broadly consistent with
estimates in Column (1). In contrast, the coe¢ cients of exchange rate half a year and
three-quarters of a year ago are signi￿cantly positive. I suspect that these unexpected
terms are due to the lack of the consideration of ￿xed e⁄ects.
From (13), it is understood that bilateral trade is also a⁄ected by the representative
￿rm￿ s output in China (￿ yk
us), which are unobservable. To control for these unobserved and
hence omitted factors, I therefore consider a ￿xed-e⁄ects speci￿cation as follows:
￿kt = ￿k + ’yt + ’qt + t + ￿kt;
where ￿k captures the unobserved, industry-speci￿c, time-invariant ￿xed-e⁄ects, whereas
13t is the time trend, ’yt is the year-varying ￿xed e⁄ects, and ’qt is the quarter-varying
￿xed e⁄ects that capture the year (quarter)-variant factors such as the global ￿nancial
crisis in 2008. However, both the year-varying and quarter-varying ￿xed e⁄ects still do
not completely capture the time-speci￿c common factors here.10 Since the objective of the
present paper is to explore how the exchange rate variable, which has no cross-sectional
variation and thus can be seen as a common time-variant factor for all industries, a⁄ects the
Sino-U.S. trade, I am not able to use year￿ quarter-varying dummies to control completely
for the time-varying ￿xed e⁄ect.11 Instead, I have to rely on both the year-varying and
quarter-varying ￿xed e⁄ects, in addition to the regular time-trend variable, and allow the
exchange rate variable to pick up the residual e⁄ect after controlling for such ￿xed e⁄ects.
In addition, denotes other unspeci￿ed idiosyncratic e⁄ects. Columns (3)￿ (4) of Table
3 report the ￿xed-e⁄ect estimation results for (14). The estimated coe¢ cient of the log
exchange rate in Column (3) is reduced to ￿1:524, which implies that a 1 percentage
point increase in the value of the RMB leads to a 1.524 percentage point decrease in
imports to the U.S. from China. The estimate in Column (4) has a very close coe¢ cient
on the exchange rate variable. In addition, it suggests that lags of previous periods in
the exchange rate have no signi￿cant e⁄ects on bilateral trade after controlling for the
two-way ￿xed e⁄ects.
[Insert Table 3 Here]
10Note that the 12 time-varying dummies included in the regressions here include 8 annual dummies to
capture year-varying ￿xed e⁄ects and 4 quarterly dummies to capture the quarter-varying ￿xed e⁄ects,
which are much fewer than the 28 year￿ quarter dummies when a quarter is treated as a unit of time.
11I thank a referee for insightfully pointing this out.
145.3 Endogeneity Issues
The bilateral exchange rate is not exogenously given but is indeed a⁄ected by the volume
of imports to the U.S. from China. In reality there may be a variety of channels through
which bilateral trade would reversely a⁄ect the bilateral exchange rate. One possible
channel is that China￿ s higher trade surplus from the U.S. could increase the U.S. political
pressure on China to appreciate the RMB. In early 2005, the termination of the Multi-
Fiber Agreement led to a surge in textile exports from China into the U.S. As a result, the
Sino-U.S. trade imbalance increased dramatically, which in turn caused special interests
groups in the U.S. to demand that the domestic textile producers be protected. To avoid
possible trade sanctions from the U.S., the Chinese government agreed to appreciate the
RMB against the dollar by 2% in July 2005.12 Moreover, the RMB was no longer pegged
to the U.S. dollar alone but to a basket of currencies. Therefore, the volume of imports
to the U.S. from China reversely a⁄ected the bilateral exchange rate.
To control for the endogeneity of the bilateral exchange rate, IV estimation is a powerful
econometric method.13 To obtain accurate estimates, I chose China￿ s monetary stock (M1)
as the instrument variable to perform the two-step general method of moments (GMM)
estimation. The main reason for adopting the GMM was that it requires fewer assumptions
about the error terms and has the ability to generate heteroskedasticity-robust standard
12Though the Chinese o¢ cials would be reluctant to admit that the U.S. diplomacy has a key role to
play in the development of the RMB. I thank a referee for correctly pointing this out.
13The IV approach is a good way to control the endogeneity issues raised by various possible sources:
reverse causality (i.e., simultaneity), omitted variables, and measurement errors. Wooldridge (2002, chap-
ter 5) carefully scrutinizes this topic. Therefore, the IV estimates here control for the endogeneity caused
by the reverse causality of the bilateral exchange rate as well as the one caused by the omitted variables
in (14).
15errors as compared with the general least-squares method (Hall, 2004). I report the
estimation results of the second-stage GMM in Columns (5)￿ (6) of Table 3.
The economic rationale for choosing M1 as an instrument for the exchange rate follows
that of Bergin and Feenstra (2008): with a tight monetary policy caused by a decreasing
money supply, Chinese interest rates increase. As a result, the surging demand for the
RMB pushes its exchange rate up.14 With a stronger RMB, the Chinese exports to the
U.S. are expected to decrease. To validate this instrument variable, I performed several
statistical tests.
First, the F-statistic test in the ￿rst stage shows that the instrument is highly sta-
tistically signi￿cant. The F-statistics are also de￿nitely high enough to pass the F-test.
Secondly, Columns (5)￿ (6) of Table 3 were checked to see whether such an exclusive in-
strument was "relevant", that is, whether it is correlated with the endogenous regressor
(i.e., the exchange rate). In my econometric model, the error term is assumed to be
heteroskedastic: ￿ijt s N(0;￿2
ij). Therefore, the usual Anderson (1984) canonical corre-
lation likelihood ratio test is invalid since it only works under the assumption. Instead,
I use the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) Wald statistic to check whether the excluded in-
strument correlates with the endogenous regressors. The null hypothesis that the model
is under-identi￿ed is rejected at the 1% signi￿cance level.
Thirdly, I test whether or not the instrument (i.e., Chinese M1) is weakly correlated
14One caveat here is that China currently still, to some extent, has capital control. A possible related
concern is that the historical link between the money supply and the exchange rate may be weak. However,
the simple correlation between the two variables in my data set is quite sizable (corr: = 0:47), hence the
concern mentioned above should not be so severe. I thank a referee for suggesting this check.
16with the exchange rate. If so, then the estimates will perform poorly in the IV estimate.
The Kleibergen and Paap (2006) F-statistics provide strong evidence to reject the null
hypothesis that the ￿rst stage is weakly identi￿ed at a highly signi￿cant level.15 Finally,
both the Anderson and Rubin (1949) statistic (which is an LM test) and the Stock and
Wright S statistic (which is a GMM distance test) reject the null hypothesis that the
coe¢ cient of the endogenous regressor is equal to zero. In short, these statistical tests
provide su¢ cient evidence that the instrument performs well and therefore the speci￿cation
is well justi￿ed.
Columns (5)￿ (6) of Table 3 report the estimation results using the Chinese M1 as an
instrument. Column (5) suggests that the elasticity of the exchange rate on imports to the
U.S. from China is ￿4:748, which is fairly close to its counterpart in Column (1) without
controlling for the endogeneity and ￿xed e⁄ects. However, in Column (6), after controlling
for the two-way ￿xed e⁄ects, the estimated magnitude of the log of the exchange rate was
reduced to 1:640, which is very close to its counterpart in Column (3), ￿1:524, without
controlling for the endogeneity.
5.4 Additional Robustness Checks
To repeat, China￿ s exchange rate against the U.S. dollar changed after July 2005. There-
fore, it is reasonable to suspect that the pass-through of the exchange rate and accordingly
its impact on the bilateral trade volume are underestimated when data from before the
structural change are included in the model. I therefore re-estimate the e⁄ects by including
15Note that the Cragg and Donald (1993) F-statistic is no longer valid since it only works under the
i.i.d. assumption.
17only the samples after the 2005 change.
[Insert Table 4 Here]
Table 4 reports the Sino-U.S. estimations for the samples during 2005￿ 2008. Brie￿ y, the
point elasticity of bilateral trade with respect to the exchange rate in all the speci￿cations
has the same statistically signi￿cant signs and close magnitudes to their counterparts
shown in Table 3. In particular, in Column (6), after controlling for the endogeneity of
the exchange rate and the two-way ￿xed e⁄ects, the appreciation of the RMB was found
to have a larger e⁄ect (^ ￿3 = ￿1:827) on reducing Sino-U.S. bilateral trade than the result
shown in Column (6) of Table 3: ^ ￿3 = ￿1:640. This ascertains that our previous conjecture
that the e⁄ect of exchange rate movement on the bilateral trade is underestimated once
the sample with a time-invariant exchange rate before 2005 is included.
Moreover, Table 5 includes both countries￿GDP per capita in the estimations to check
if they have signi￿cant e⁄ects on bilateral trade as these variables are standard in recent
gravity models (e.g., see Rose, 2004; Subramanian and Wei, 2007). In all the estimations,
China￿ s GDP per capita has a signi￿cant and positive sign whereas the U.S. counterparts
are insigni￿cant at the conventional statistical level. Nevertheless, the appreciation of the
RMB still has a signi￿cantly negative e⁄ect on the imports to the U.S. from China in all
the speci￿cations.
[Insert Table 5 Here]
185.5 Alternative Measures on Trade and Exchange Rate16
As mentioned above, the estimations in the present paper are based on the augmented
Anderson and van Wincooop (2003) theoretical model in which the regressand of their
empirical speci￿cations is measured as trade ￿ ows divided by the product of GDPs. The
equilibrium condition for the bilateral trade ￿ ow (11) also illustrates this point:
ln(Xch
us;k=Y chY us
k ) = lnsch
k ￿lne￿lnpch
k +(1￿￿)lnpch;us;k ￿(1￿￿)lnPk ￿ln ￿ ych
k : (15)
Therefore, I perform the estimations by using the trade ratio, which is de￿ned as
American imports from China divided by the product of GDPs, as the regressand in
Table 6. All the estimated coe¢ cients for the exchange rate in Columns (1)￿ (3) are
highly signi￿cant at conventional statistical levels. The OLS estimate in Column (1)
suggests that the point elasticity of trade ratio with respect to the exchange rate is ￿2:414.
After controlling for the two-way ￿xed e⁄ects, the e⁄ect is reduced to 1.532 as shown in
Column (2), which is very close to its counterpart in Column (3) of Table 3: ￿1:524. A
further exploration by including the previous exchange rate realizations does not change
the estimation results. The magnitude of the current exchange rate equals ￿1:501 in
Column (3), which again is close to that in Column (2): ￿1:532. All of these ￿ndings
suggest that the main message that RMB appreciation leads to low American imports
from China is robust regardless of di⁄erent forms of regressand.
[Insert Table 6 Here]
16I am most grateful to two anonymous referees for their insightful suggestions on Subsections 5.5￿ 5.7.
19Since the in￿ ation rate in China and the U.S. certainly did not track exactly over
2002￿ 2008, it is worthwhile exploring how the real Sino-U.S. exchange rate a⁄ects the
American imports from China. Following previous works such as Zhang (2001), I proxy
the real exchange rate as the product of the nominal exchange rate (e) and a fraction of
the American producer price index (PPIUS) in the denominator and China￿ s producer
price index (PPICH) in the numerator:e ￿ PPICH
PPIUS : The OLS estimates in Column (4)
and the ￿xed-e⁄ects estimates in Column (5) of Table 6 suggest that real exchange rate
appreciation leads to low American imports from China. These results are still robust
even when the three-quarter lags of real exchange rate realizations are included, as shown
in Column (6).
5.6 Additional Estimates with Other Competing Trading Partners
As highlighted by Anderson and van Wincooop (2003), to estimate the gravity model
precisely, it is essential for researchers to control for the "multilateral resistance". The
basic idea is that the bilateral trade ￿ ow is not simply a⁄ected by the two trading countries￿
economic factors but is also a⁄ected by factors from all other trading countries. That
is, trade volumes are determined by relative export barriers but not by absolute trade
barriers. Although the theoretical model above suggests that the American imports from
China explicitly depend on the U.S. and Chinese incomes, the Sino-U.S. exchange rate,
and the prices of traded goods in China and the U.S., it also implies that the American
imports from China are also a⁄ected by imports from other countries.17 In fact, it is
17To see this point, note that the American aggregate industrial price index in the derived gravity
equation (11) depends on many exporters￿numbers of varieties, as shown in (5).
20possible that the American imports from China are a⁄ected by its imports from some
Asian countries that have patterns of exports similar to China.18 Indeed, the exchange
rates in such countries also adjust after the dollar depreciation against the RMB. Therefore,
it is worthwhile seeing how the variation of such an American exporters￿exchange rate as
well as that of the RMB vis-￿-vis the US dollar a⁄ect the U.S. imports.
To address this concern, I include data of Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Thailand, and
Vietnam as well as China in the sample.19 Their basic statistics are reported in Module
B of Table 1. Hence, my cross-country sample increases from 1,730 to 6,305. Column (1)
of Table 7 reports the OLS estimation results, which suggest that the RMB appreciation
against the U.S. dollar decreases the ratio of American imports from such Asian trading
partners (i.e., the U.S. imports over the product of the 2 trading countries￿GDPs). The
negative sign of the exchange rate variable still remains statistically signi￿cant even by
including the past exchange rate realizations, as shown in Column (2).
To control e⁄ectively for the "multilateral resistance" e⁄ect in the gravity estimations,
following Baldwin and Taglioni (2006), Column (3) performs the estimates with the time-
varying country-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects as well as the regular industry-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects.
Since the panel in my sample includes 6 American trading countries with 28 time spans, I
generate 168 (i.e., 6￿28) dummies for unidirectional trade data (e.g., exports from China
to the U.S.) in addition to the regular industy-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects. It turns out that a
18I thank a referee for insightfully suggesting this point.
19Here data of Hong Kong are not included since Hong Kong kept a ￿xed exchange rate against the U.S.
dollar over time and hence it is impossible to explore the e⁄ects of the movement of the exchange rate on
bilateral trade.
2110% appreciation of the exporter￿ s exchange rate is associated with an 11% decrease in
the ratio of U.S. imports from such countries. This ￿nding is insensitive once the 3-period
past exchange rate realizations are included in the estimations, as shown in Column (4).
Finally, Columns (5)￿ (6) examine the e⁄ect of real exchange rate movement on the import
ratio of the U.S. from such trading countries. The OLS estimate in Column (5) suggests
that real exchange appreciation signi￿cantly reduces the U.S. imports from such Asian
trading partners.
[Insert Table 7 Here]
5.7 Further Estimates on Sectoral Heterogeneity
In all the estimations above, the exchange rate variable varies over years but does not
change across industries. The homogeneity assumption on the exchange rate coe¢ cient
may be acceptable if the aggregate trade ￿ ow is of interest. However, the exchange rate
pass-through, as a function of market (pricing) power, would vary considerably across
industries. Hence, it is important for us to study the heterogenous e⁄ect of the exchange
rate on the industry-level bilateral trade.
The common correlated e⁄ects (CCE) approach is a good way to identify such het-
erogenous e⁄ects of the exchange rate across industries. As introduced by Pesaran (2006),
the basic idea is to ￿lter the industry-speci￿c regressors by means of cross-section averages.
In this way, as the number of industries becomes larger and larger, the di⁄erential e⁄ects
of unobserved common factors converge to zero asymptotically. In particular, the CCE
estimator is obtained by two steps following Eberhardt and Teal (2009). First, I perform
2262 OLS estimations by each industry i and obtain its coe¢ cients ^ bi. Secondly, the CCE
estimators are those averaged across sectors: ^ bCCE =
P
i ^ bi=62:
Table 8 reports the estimation results by using this common factor approach to spatial
heterogeneity. Columns (1)￿ (3) use the U.S. imports from China as the regressand. The
point elasticity of bilateral imports with respect to the exchange rate is ￿1:148 in Column
(1), which is quite close to the ￿xed-e⁄ect estimate in Column (4) of Table 3: ￿1:483. Such
magnitudes do not vary much either when trading partners￿per capita GDPs are included
or when past exchange rate realizations are taken into account. By way of comparison,
Columns (4)￿ (6) adopt the import ratio divided by the product of trading countries￿GDPs
as the regressand. It turns out that the CCE estimator of the exchange rate is ￿:964 in
Column (4). Its magnitudes increase once the trading partners￿per capita GDPs are
considered in Column (5) or past exchange rate realizations are included in Column (6).
Nevertheless, in any case, all the CCE estimates suggest that the appreciation of the RMB
against the dollar signi￿cantly reduced the imports to the U.S. from China.
[Insert Table 8 Here]
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I investigate the e⁄ect of the RMB appreciation on imports to the U.S.
from China using industrial panel data from 2002 to 2008. Di⁄erently from other pure
reduced-form estimations, my estimations are guided by an augmented theoretical gravity
model. Structural parameters based on a theoretical framework will help us to understand
the magnitude of RMB revaluation on Sino-U.S. bilateral trade. The estimation results
23clearly suggest that the RMB appreciation against the dollar signi￿cantly reduced imports
to the U.S. from China. These ￿ndings are robust to di⁄erent econometric methods and
di⁄erent data periods.
This ￿nding has policy implications. Firstly, if appreciation of the RMB does signif-
icantly reduce the Sino-U.S. bilateral trade imbalance, then it would have the bene￿cial
e⁄ect of relieving the trade tensions between the two giants. Secondly, RMB appreciation
would make it more di¢ cult for Chinese exporters to export to the U.S. ceteris paribus,
which in turn would require Chinese exporting ￿rms to make every e⁄ort to boost their
productivity to survive in the global competition.
Several extensions and possible generalizations merit special consideration. One of
them is to replace the industrial price index with actual unit-value f.o.b. prices, if the
data are available. In this manner, the exchange rate pass-through can be more precisely
identi￿ed. Another possible extension is to include import tari⁄s in the model and to
examine the symmetry hypothesis between the exchange rate and the tari⁄s. Due to the
data constraint, I am not able to explore these issues here. However, these are the topics
that I will pursue in future work.
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26Table 1: Concordance of Industries
Module A: Concordance between China￿ s PPI and Trade Sectors













Cultural, Educational & Handicrafts Article 60,61
Module B: Concordance between US Industrial Sectors and Trade Sectors
Name of US Industrial Sectors Sectoral Code for the Sino-US Trade
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing & Hunting 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,13,14,16,21
Mining 20
Wood Products 39
Nonmetallic Mineral Products 42
Primary Metals 43,44
Fabricated Metal Products 45,55
Machinery 46,47, 48,49
Computer & Electronic Products 50,51
Electrical Equipment, Appliances 52
Motor Vehicles and Parts 53
Other Transportation Equipment 54
Furniture and Related Products 56
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 60,61,62
Food & Beverage & Tobacco Products 10,11,12,25,26,27
Textile Mills & Textile Product Mills 18,41
Apparel, Leather & Allied Products 37,57,58,59
Paper Products 17,40
Printing & Related Support Activities 30
Petroleum and Coal Products 15,22,23,24
Chemical Products 19,28,29,31,32,33,36
Plastics & Rubber Products 34,35,38
Note: In Module A the power industry is not included here since it is not involved in the Sino-US.
bilateral trade.
27Table 2: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Basic Statistics for Sino-US Trade (2002-2008)
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Log US Imports from China 1,730 1.893 1.255 -2.698 4.187
Log GDP of the USA (million) 1,736 6.495 .047 6.419 6.560
Log GDPPC of the USA 1,736 -1.954 .047 -2.031 -1.893
Log GDP of China 1,736 5.745 .190 5.408 6.132
Log GDPPC of China 1,736 2.652 .150 2.319 2.912
Log China￿ s PPI 1,736 1.992 .120 1.436 2.496
Log PPI of the USA 1,736 2.181 .080 1.929 2.420
Log Exchange Rate ($=RMB) 1,736 -.882 .096 -.917 -.398
1-Lag of Log Exchange Rate ($=RMB) 1,674 -.901 .024 -.917 -.835
2-Lag of Log Exchange Rate ($=RMB) 1,612 -.903 .020 -.917 -.842
3-Lag of Log Exchange Rate ($=RMB) 1,550 -.906 .017 -.917 -.855
Log China￿ s Monetary Base (M1) 1,736 7.008 .128 6.774 7.220
1-Lag of Log China￿ s Monetary Base 1,674 3.992 .125 3.775 4.192
2-Lag of Log China￿ s Monetary Base 1,612 3.985 .121 3.775 4.189
3-Lag of Log China￿ s Monetary Base 1,550 3.977 .116 3.775 4.178
Year 1,736 2005 2.000 2002 2008
Quarter 1,736 2.5 1.118 1 4
Industrial Code for Sino-US Trade 1,736 31.4 17.900 1 62
Panel B: Basic Statistics for US Imports from 7 Asian Countries (2005-2008)
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Log US Imports 6,319 1.314 1.386 -3 4.623
Log GDP of the USA (million) 6,720 3.495 .047 3.419 3.560
Log GDPPC of the USA 6,720 4.027 .039 3.963 4.080
Log GDP of Exporters 6,720 2.339 .538 .939 3.132
Log GDPPC of Exporters 6,460 3.557 .463 2.031 3.980
Log PPI of Exporters 6,584 2.019 .057 1.978 2.415
Log PPI of the USA 6,720 2.166 .050 2.095 2.273
Log Exchange Rate ($ per local currency) 6,720 -2.351 .876 -4.229 -.833
1-Lag of Log Exchange Rate 6,652 -2.285 .842 -4.229 -.833
2-Lag of Log Exchange Rate 6,585 -2.299 .847 -4.229 -.833
3-Lag of Log Exchange Rate 6,519 -2.296 .847 -4.229 -.833
Log Exporters￿Monetary Base (M1) 6,720 4.143 1.158 2.502 5.680
1-Lag of Log Exporters￿Monetary Base 6,549 4.071 1.159 2.502 5.680
2-Lag of Log Exporters￿Monetary Base 6,486 4.080 1.164 2.502 5.680
3-Lag of Log Exporters￿Monetary Base 6,423 4.080 1.162 2.502 5.680
Year 6,720 2005 2.000 2002 2008
Quarter 6,720 2.5 1.118 1 4
Industrial Code for Sino-US Trade 6,720 31.4 17.900 1 68
28Table 3: E⁄ects of RMB Revaluation on the Imports to the U.S. from China (2002-2008)
Imports to the U.S. from China OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Exchange Rate ($=RMB) -4.647** -4.442** -1.524** -1.483** -4.748** -1.640**
(-8.03) (-7.34) (-9.84) (-9.37) (-2.56) (-2.15)
Log Exchange Rate (1-Lag) .353 .214 -.678 .510
(1.19) (1.17) (-.16) (.07)
Log Exchange Rate (2-Lag ) .609** .204 -.996 .036
(2.05) (1.24) (-.16) (.04)
Log Exchange Rate (3-Lag) .719** .198 -.331 .096
(2.31) (1.60) (-.08) (.15)
Log China￿ s Price Index -3.265** -3.144** -.321** -2.71* -3.344** -.403
(-7.03) (-6.33) (-2.31) (-1.95) (-4.37) (-.71)
Log US Price Index -4.580** -4.789** .795** 1.103** -4.719** 1.145**
(-11.35) (-11.82) (4.83) (5.92) (-9.50) (4.22)
Log GDP of U.S. 8.223** 8.363** 2.322 -1.043 17.245 1.838
(4.35) (4.28) (1.34) (-.29) (.20) (.13)
Log GDP of China .899* .516 .831 .356 5.015 .778
(1.84) (1.01) (1.06) (.34) (.24) (.23)
Time Trend -.005 .018 -.635 -.068
(-.27) (.66) (-.22) (-.15)
Year-speci￿c Fixed E⁄ects No No Yes Yes No Yes
Quarter-speci￿c Fixed E⁄ects No No Yes Yes No Yes
Industry-speci￿c Fixed E⁄ects No No Yes Yes No Yes
First-stage F-statistics 56.28y 21.46y
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM Statistic 38.24y 28.76y
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald Statistic 46.85y 29.32y
Anderson-Rubin ￿2 Statistic 8.49y 5.27
Stock-Wright LM S Statistic 8.21y 5.25
Prob.>F or Prob.>￿2 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Number of Observations 1,730 1544 1730 1544 1544 1544
R2 .165 .172 .531 .507 .174 .506
Notes: numbers in parenthesis are t-values. *(**) indicates signi￿cance at 1 (5) percent level. z
indicates that the p-value of the statistic is less than 0.01.
29Table 4: E⁄ects of RMB Revaluation on the Imports to the U.S. from China (2005-2008)
American Imports from China OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Exchange Rate ($=RMB) -4.383** -4.249** -1.534** -1.530** -3.917** -1.827**
(-6.18) (-.601) (-9.42) (-8.79) (-2.62) (-3.20)
Log Exchange Rate (1-Lag) .215 .211 -.225 .295
(.67) (1.01) (-.09) (.81)
Log Exchange Rate (2-Lag ) .426 .177** -.066 .194
(1.33) (2.12) (-.02) (.44)
Log Exchange Rate (3-Lag) .525 .159 .172 .177
(1.58) (.97) (.07) (.50)
Log China￿ s Price Index -2.732** -2.785** -.313** -.306** -2.776** -.503
(-4.79) (-4.82) (-2.18) (-2.12) (-3.50) (-1.04)
Log US Price Index -4.235** -4.304** 1.470** 1.445** -4.322** 1.373**
(-9.32) (-9.58) (4.71) (4.53) (-9.09) (3.30)
Log GDP of U.S. 10.274** 8.338** 2.052 -2.129 9.713 -3.805
(3.03) (2.25) (.99) (-.44) (.18) (-.50)
Log GDP of China 1.009 .796 1.350 1.052 .185 2.379
(1.61) (1.24) (1.16) (.45) (.01) (.79)
Time Trend -.17 .002 -.017 -.233
(-.66) (.04) (-.01) (-.60)
Year-speci￿c Fixed E⁄ects No No Yes Yes No Yes
Quarter-speci￿c Fixed E⁄ects No No Yes Yes No Yes
Industry-speci￿c Fixed E⁄ects No No Yes Yes No Yes
First-stage F-statistics 89.49y 37.46y
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM Statistic 174.99y 52.51y
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald Statistic 170.37y 55.66y
Anderson-Rubin ￿2 Statistic 8.59y 14.79y
Stock-Wright LM S Statistic 8.17y 14.56y
Prob.>F or Prob.>￿2 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Number of Observations 990 990 990 990 990 990
R2 .166 .169 .456 .457 .170 .455
Notes: numbers in parenthesis are t-values. *(**) indicates signi￿cance at 1 (5) percent level. z
indicates that the p-value of the statistic is less than 0.01. Here quarter-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects instead of
year-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects are included.
30Table 5: More Robustness Checks for the Imports to the U.S. from China (2002-2008)
Imports to the U.S. from China OLS FE IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Exchange Rate ($=RMB) -4.832** -4.508** -1.687** -1.657** -7.200*
(-7.79) (-6.98) (-10.13) (-9.51) (-1.89)
Log Exchange Rate (1-Lag) -.035 .203
(-.10) (1.03)
Log Exchange Rate (2-Lag ) .274 .191
(.74) (1.15)
Log Exchange Rate (3-Lag) .380 .190
(1.09) (1.37)
Log China￿ s Price Index -3.522** -3.245** -.453** -.408** -4.626**
(-7.15) (-6.35) (-3.09) (-2.77) (-2.54)
Log US Price Index -4.630** -4.781** .827** 1.125** -4.371**
(-11.62) (-11.83) (5.02) (6.05) (-7.58)
Log GDP of U.S. 2.178 -.030 -1.771 -2.392 33.918
(.10) (-.00) (-.33) (-.37) (.62)
Log GDP of China .364 .198 1.169 .724 1.294
(.50) (.26) (1.47) (.67) (.78)
Log GDP per capita of U.S. -2.829 -.001 3.020 .980 -22.650
(-.20) (-.00) (.76) (.19) (-.66)
Log GDP per capita of China 1.915* 1.341 1.249** 1.202** 2.454*
(1.74) (1.03) (2.83) (2.77) (1.71)
Time Trend .030 .037 -.029 -.009
(.46) (.45) (-1.36) (-.32)
Year-speci￿c Fixed E⁄ects No No Yes Yes No
Quarter-speci￿c Fixed E⁄ects No No Yes Yes No
Industry-speci￿c Fixed E⁄ects No No Yes Yes No
First-stage F-statistics 39.10y
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM Statistic 37.35y
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald Statistic 39.29y
Anderson-Rubin ￿2 Statistic 3.46y
Stock-Wright LM S Statistic 3.43y
Prob.>F or Prob.>￿2 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Number of Observations 1730 1544 1730 1544 1730
R2 .171 .174 .533 .509 .161
Notes: numbers in parenthesis are t-values. *(**) indicates signi￿cance at 1 (5) percent level. z
indicates that the p-value of the statistic is less than 0.01.
31Table 6: Alternative Measures on Bilateral Trade and Exchange Rate
Regressand: log(XCH
US =YCHYUS) Nominal Exchange Rate Real Exchange Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Exchange Rate ($=RMB) -2.414** -1.532** -1.501** ￿ ￿ ￿
(-126.30) (-10.17) (-9.98)
Log Real Exchange Rate ( $
RMB
PPI_CH
PPI_US ) ￿ ￿ ￿ -.178 -.556** -.518**
(-.42) (-4.23) (-2.61)
Log (Real) Exchange Rate (1-Lag) .123 -.308
(1.37) (-1.21)
Log (Real) Exchange Rate (2-Lag ) .100 .352
(1.15) (1.36)
Log (Real) Exchange Rate (3-Lag) .132 -.149
(1.58) (-.60)
Log China￿ s Price Index -2.651** -.323** -.268* ￿ ￿ ￿
(-11.17) (-2.34) (-1.93)
Log US Price Index -4.623** .802** 1.107** ￿ ￿ ￿
(-11.55) (4.88) (5.95)
Time Trend -.041** -.001 -.006** -.007** -.003** -.006**
(9.21) (-1.17) (-2.77) (-1.99) (-3.14) (-4.58)
Year-speci￿c Fixed E⁄ects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Quarter-speci￿c Fixed E⁄ects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Industry-speci￿c Fixed E⁄ects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Prob.>F or Prob.>￿2 .000 .000 .000 .100 .000 .000
Number of Observations 1,730 1,730 1,544 1,730 1,730 1,730
R2 .157 .356 .398 .003 .219 .247
Notes: XCH
US denotes imports to the U.S. from China. Numbers in parenthesis are t-values. *(**)
indicates signi￿cance at 1 (5) percent level.
32Table 7: Bilateral Estimates with other Asian Countries
Regressand: log(Xi
US=YiYUS) OLS FE OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Exchange Rate (ei) -2.036** -1.158** ￿ 1.102** -1.116** ￿
(-70.14) (-37.71) (-2.86) (-2.83)
Log Real Exchange Rate (ei
PPI
PPI_US) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ -2.107**
(-89.58)
Log Exchange Rate (1-Lag) -.662** -.001 .064**
(-22.93) (-.003) (2.17)
Log Exchange Rate (2-Lag ) -.673** -.019 .038
(-23.90) (-1.19) (1.29)
Log Exchange Rate (3-Lag) -.646** -.021 -.019
(-22.37) (-1.05) (-.65)
Log Exporter￿ s Price Index .262 .578* .745 .641 ￿
(.70) (1.88) (.39) (.34)
Log US Price Index -3.760* -2.863* .614 .477 ￿
(-8.62) (-7.89) (.43) (.33)
Time-varying Country Fixed E⁄ects No No Yes Yes No
Industry-speci￿c Fixed E⁄ects No No Yes Yes No
Prob.>F or Prob.>￿2 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Number of Observations 6,305 5,986 6,305 5,986 5,902
R2 .538 .670 .796 .649 .520
Notes: Xi
US denotes imports to the U.S. from exporter i. The exporters here include China, Indonesia,
Japan, Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam. Numbers in parenthesis are t-values. Here exchange rate (ei) is
de￿ned as dollar per exporter i￿ s currency. There are 168 (i.e., 6*28) time-varying country dummies and
68 industrial dummies in the FE estimations. *(**) indicates signi￿cance at 1 (5) percent level.




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Exchange Rate (e) -1.148** -1.164 -1.085 -.964** -3.249** -3.610**
(-3.90) (-1.28) (-1.12) (-3.08) (-5.60) (-4.68)
Log Exchange Rate (1-Lag) .069 -.125
(.44) (-.90)
Log Exchange Rate (2-Lag ) .359** .193*
(2.98) (1.75)
Log Exchange Rate (3-Lag) .172** .045
(2.21) (.28)
Log GDP of U.S. (YUS) 1.248 1.892 -3.499 ￿ ￿
(.80) (.57) (-.78)
Log GDP of China (YCH) .063 .188 .096 ￿ ￿
(.64) (.89) (.43)
Log China￿ s Price Index .073 .034 .001 .419 -1.945** -2.407**
(.23) (.04) (.00) (1.22) (-3.56) (-3.30)
Log US Price Index 1.881** 2.238** 2.299** 1.234* 2.537** 3.293**
(2.87) (3.15) (2.39) (1.89) (3.41) (3.14)
Log US GDP per capita -1.507 1.213 -.376 -.063
(-.69) (.46) (-.34) (-.05)
Log China￿ s GDP per capita .301 -.147 2.055** 2.337**
(.38) (-.21) (4.56) (6.09)
Time Trend .011 .003 .028* -.008** -.036** -.040**
(1.19) (.24) (1.81) (-2.48) (-4.36) (-3.51)
Number of Industry 62 62 62 62 62 62
Number of Observations 1,736 1,736 1,736 1,736 1,736 1,736
Notes: XCH
US denotes imports to the U.S. from China. Numbers in parenthesis are t-values. *(**)
indicates signi￿cance at 1 (5) percent level.
34CN: Official Rate: Period Average: National Currency per USD ( International Monetary Fund)

























































































































Data Source: CEIC Database
Figure 1: The American Imports from China and The RMB Appreciation Trajectory
(2002-2008)
35Appendix Table 1: Main Notation for the Models
Symbol De￿nition
Panel A: Theoretical Framework
Ch
i;us;k Amount of goods h of industry k produced in country i and consumed
in the U.S.
Nik Number of goods of industry k produced in country i
￿ Elasticity of substitution, ￿ > 1
e Sino-U.S. Bilateral exchange rate ($=RMB)
Y ch Level of GDP in China
Y us
k Output level of industry k in the U.S.
pch;us;k Price of industry k on an American c.i.f. (cost, insurance, freight) basis
pch;k Price of industry k on a f.o.b. (free on board) basis
Xch
us;k Value of exports of industry k from China to the U.S.
Pk American aggregate price index of industry k
wch Wages in China
lch
k Labor input for the representative ￿rm of industry k in China
ych
k Output of China￿ s representative ￿rm of industry k , which is a ￿xed
number in equilibrium: ych
k = ￿ ych
k
￿ch
k Fixed cost for the representative ￿rm of industry k in China
sch
k Industry k￿ s output share in China
￿ch
k Constant marginal cost for the representative ￿rm of industry k in China
Panel B: Empirical Speci￿cation
￿k Unspeci￿ed industrial bilateral border e⁄ect
￿kt Error term in Speci￿cation (13)
￿k Industry-speci￿c random variable
’yt Year-speci￿c random variable
’qt Quarter-speci￿c random variable
￿kt Industrial idiosyncratic random variable
36